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Abstract
In this paper I argue that Poincaré’s acceptance of the atom does not indicate a shift 
from instrumentalism to scientific realism. I examine the implications of Poincaré’s 
acceptance  of  the  existence  of  the  atom  for  our  current  understanding  of  his 
philosophy of science. Specifically, how can we understand Poincaré’s acceptance of 
the atom in structural realist terms? I examine his 1912 paper carefully and suggest 
that it does not entail scientific realism in the sense of acceptance of the fundamental 
existence  of  atoms  but  rather,  argues  against  fundamental  entities.  I  argue  that 
Poincaré’s paper motivates a non-fundamentalist view about the world, and that this is 
compatible with his structuralism. 
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1. Introduction
In  the  current  literature  it  is  widely  accepted  that  Poincaré  advanced  structural 
realism, which commits one to the structural claims of scientific theories and not the 
claims regarding unobservable entities. However, Poincaré's (1913)1 paper, in which 
he accepts the reality of the atom, appears to go against his anti-realism regarding 
unobservable entities and thus challenges our current understanding of his philosophy 
as defending structural realism. 
In this paper I examine whether Poincaré's acceptance of the atom indicates a 
shift  from structural  to  scientific  realism,  which  would  accommodate  his  alleged 
commitment to unobservable entities. I explore why admitting the reality of the atom 
would  seem  to  challenge  Poincaré's  structural  realism  but  argue  that  Poincaré's 
argument  is  compatible  with  his  Kantianism  and  structuralism.  By  looking  at 
Poincaré's  argument  for  the  acceptance of  the  atom closely,  I  argue  that  it  is  not 
intended as a positive argument in defense of realism towards unobservable entities 
but is aimed against fundamentalism, a thesis according to which reality is composed 
of levels and there is a fundamental level on which the rest supervene. I examine the 
argument and suggest that it is an inductive argument against fundamentalism. I show 
that this argument is compatible with Poincaré's structural realism. 
The structure of  this  paper  is  as  follows.  In  section 2,  I  present  structural 
realism, a view which, in the modern literature, is taken to originate in Poincaré’s 
philosophy of science. Section 3 presents Poincaré's argument for the acceptance of 
the  atom,  developed  in  1912,  just  after  Perrin’s  experiments  were  announced.  In 
section 4, I examine how this acceptance challenges a structural realist interpretation 
1 The paper was presented in 1912 before the French Society of Physics and published in Poincaré’s 
(1913).
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of Poincaré's  philosophy,  and how it  could be seen  as  suggesting  a  shift  towards 
scientific realism. In section 5, I concentrate on the argument for the acceptance of the 
atom and show that Poincaré did not only argue for the changing status of the atomic 
hypothesis but also against fundamentalism. In section 6, I explain why this argument 
is compatible with structural realism. Section 7 is the conclusion. 
2. Poincaré’s Structural Realism 
In the modern literature, Poincaré’s view about scientific theories has been revived by 
John Worrall (1989) and since known as 'structural realism'2. This view is motivated 
by two different problems with which Poincaré was concerned – how to account for 
the novel predictive success of scientific theories, and also for the constant failure of 
these theories to reveal the underlying nature of reality.3 In a famous passage from 
Science and Hypothesis,  Poincaré formulated the argument  for  the ‘bankruptcy of 
science’,  known  in  the  modern  literature  as  the  'pessimistic  meta-induction'. 
According to Poincaré:
The ephemeral nature of scientific theories takes by surprise the man of the 
world. Their brief period of prosperity ended, he sees them abandoned one 
after another; he sees ruins piled upon ruins; he predicts that the theories in 
fashion to-day will in a short time succumb in their turn, and he concludes 
that  they  are  absolutely  in  vain.  This  is  what  he  calls  the  bankruptcy  of  
science. (Poincaré 2001, 122)
The  pessimistic  meta-induction  motivates  anti-realism4 about  scientific  theories. 
Following Duhem, who famously stated that the history of science is the grave yard of 
attempted explanations, and Poincaré’s argument for the bankruptcy of science, Larry 
Laudan (1981) makes a meta-induction over failed past theories5 to argue that we 
have inductive grounds to conclude that our theories, in their turn, will be abandoned. 
This  argument  motivates  anti-realism about  current  scientific  theories.  But  neither 
Poincaré,  nor  his  contemporary,  Pierre  Duhem,  were  anti-realists  about  scientific 
theories. The reason is that the history of science also motivates scientific realism.  
Both Duhem and Poincaré are struck by the ability of scientific theories to 
predict novel facts, that is, phenomena that the theories are not designed to save are 
nevertheless predicted by them. Duhem calls such theories ‘prophets’: “a theory that 
tells us the results of an experiment before it has occurred.” (Duhem 1954, 27)6 In 
2 The term 'structural realism' was first introduced by Grover Maxwell in his (1962), referring to the  
thesis developed by Bertrand Russell in The Analysis of Matter (1927). Structural realism, as a thesis 
motivated by the problem of theory change, was first introduced by Giedymin (1982) in the context of  
Poincaré's views on scientific theories and made widely known by Worrall (1989).
3 Note  that  the  argument  from  theory  change  is  not  the  only  argument  Poincaré  develops  as  a 
motivation for structural realism. Apart from his claim that only relational knowledge survives theory 
change, which is historically contingent, Poincaré also argues that theories themselves are systems of  
relations expressed  by mathematical  formalism (Poincaré 1902, 144-145) and also that  the aim of 
science is to discover relations not the 'causes' or 'natures' of realities (Poincaré 1902, xxiv).
4 For this argument Poincaré is often interpreted as instrumentalist or conventionalist. However, these 
readings do not take into consideration the positive arguments advocated by Poincaré, such as the no 
miracles argument and the argument for continuity in theory change. 
5 The examples Laudan mentions are many: crystalline spheres in astronomy, the caloric theory of heat, 
the vibratory theory of heat, the ether theory, the phlogiston theory, etc.
6 Examples  of  empirically  successful  theories  which  managed  to  make  novel  predictions  include 
Newtonian  Mechanics’ prediction  of  the  existence  of  a  hitherto  unobserved  planet,  Neptune  (the 
prediction was done independently by Le Verrier and Adams between 1845 and 1846 and the planet 
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articulating this argument further, Putnam suggests that “realism is that it is the only 
philosophy that does not make the success of science a miracle.” (Putnam 1975, 73) 
This 'no miracles argument' suggests that no explanation of the success of scientific 
theories in predicting novel facts can be provided if we adopt anti-realism. In order to 
explain this success,  we should believe in the (approximate) truth of our theories, 
therefore adopt scientific realism.
As already mentioned, Poincaré attempts to account for both arguments from 
the history of science. He argues that even though theories are abandoned, there is 
continuity at the level of mathematical equations in theory change. He suggests that 
science is cumulative and that the empirical success of old theories is preserved in the 
new  theory.  What  is  lost  is  the  ontology  of  the  theory  –  the  theoretical  entities 
associated  with  the  interpretation  of  the  equations.  The  mathematical  equations 
nevertheless,  survive  theory  change.  This  following  passage  from  Poincaré  is  a 
defense of structural realism7: 
The ephemeral nature of scientific theories takes by surprise the man of 
the world. Their brief period of prosperity ended, he sees them abandoned 
one  after  another;  he  sees  ruins  piled  upon ruins;  he  predicts  that  the 
theories in fashion today will in a short time succumb in their turn, and he 
concludes  that  they  are  absolutely  in  vain.  This  is  what  he  calls  the 
bankruptcy of science.
His skepticism is superficial; he does not take into account the object of 
scientific theories and the part they play, or he would understand that the 
ruins may be still good for something. No theory seemed established on 
firmer ground than Fresnel's, which attributed light to the movements of 
the ether. Then if Maxwell's theory is today preferred, does that mean that 
Fresnel’s  work was in vain? No; for  Fresnel’s  object was not to know 
whether there really is an ether, if it is or is not formed of atoms, if these 
atoms really move in this way or that; his object was to predict optical 
phenomena. 
[…] 
It cannot be said that this is reducing physical theories to simple practical 
recipes; these equations express relations, and if the equations remain true, 
it is because the relations preserve their reality. They teach us now, as they 
did then, that there is such and such a relation between this thing and that; 
only the something which we then called motion, we now call  electric 
current. But these are merely names of the images we substituted for the 
real  objects  which  Nature  will  hide  for  ever  from our  eyes.  The  true 
relations  between these  real  objects  are  the  only  reality  we can  attain 
(Poincaré 2001, 122)
was first observed by Galle in 1846), Mendeleev’s periodic table of elements, which in 1870 predicted 
the existence and atomic properties of three unknown elements (Gallium, Scandium, Germanium), and 
Fresnel’s wave theory of light predicted that a white spot would appear at the center of a shadow of an  
opaque disc.
7 Duhem also argues that a ‘natural classification’, an empirically successful theory that makes novel 
predictions and is unified with other theories, “expresses profound and real relations among things.” 
(Duhem 1954, 28)
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Worrall  (1989)  argues  that  the  above  arguments  given  by  Poincaré  favour 
structural realism, which accounts for both the pessimistic meta-induction and the no 
miracles argument. The idea is that at the level of ontology we should be anti-realists 
and believe that the entities postulated by our current theories are probably going to 
be abandoned, as is the case with the caloric, the ether and phlogiston. But we can be 
realists at the level of structure, which is expressed in the mathematical equations that 
survive theory change.8 Worrall argues, using the example discussed by Poincaré of 
the  transition  from  Fresnel’s  elastic  ether  theory  to  Maxwell’s  theory  of  the 
electromagnetic field, that:
There was an important element of continuity in the shift from Fresnel to 
Maxwell—and this was much more than a simple question of carrying 
over the successful empirical content into the new theory.  At the same 
time it was rather less than a carrying over of the full theoretical content 
or full  theoretical mechanisms (even in “approximate” form).  … There 
was continuity or accumulation in the shift, but the continuity is one of 
form or structure, not of content. (Worrall 1989, 117)
According  to  structural  realism science  is  cumulative;  in  theory  change there  are 
elements  of  the  old  theory that  are  retained in  the  new one.  This  preservation  is 
structural,  not  ontological,  and  is  expressed  in  the  mathematical  equations  of 
empirically successful theories. In the transition from Fresnel’s theory to Maxwell’s 
theory  of  electromagnetism  the  equations  of  the  former  theory  are  completely 
preserved  in  the  latter  theory.  These  equations  carry  different  interpretations:  in 
Fresnel’s theory light is a disturbance in the ether, in Maxwell’s theory the disturbance  
is  due  to  the  nature  of  the  electromagnetic  field.  Nevertheless,  Worrall  argues, 
“Fresnel’s  theory  had  correctly  identified  certain  relations  between  optical 
phenomena,  the  equations  of  Fresnel’s  theory  are  directly  and  fully  entailed  by 
Maxwell’s theory.” (ibid, 159) It has been objected that the above example of theory 
change is not typical for theory change. Worrall, however, argues that more often in 
the  history  of  science  the  equations  of  the  old  theory  are  limiting  cases  of  the 
equations  of  the  new  theory.  The  structural  continuity  is  shown  by  the  general 
correspondence principle. 
It is debatable whether Poincaré's philosophy can be characterised as 'realist', 
as  Worrall's  reading suggests.  A premise  of  structural  realism is  the  metaphysical 
claim  that  the  world  has  a  mind-independent  structure  which  scientific  theories 
discover. Poincaré does not seem to be committed to this claim. As  Mary Domski 
(2000) argues, Worrall's characterisation of Poincaré is limited and does not preserve 
central arguments Poincaré develops in his epistemology, such as his neo-Kantianism 
and his conventionalism.  Poincaré's conventionalism is rooted into his neo-Kantian 
understanding of geometry. Even though Poincaré argues that we make a conventional  
choice  between  geometries  of  constant  curvature,  and  in  that  sense  geometry  is 
conventional and not synthetic a priori, geometry is nevertheless constructed from the 
concept of a group which pre-exists in our mind and is constitutive in the same sense 
8 Poincaré argues that the equations reveal the relations between 'real things', the 'things in themselves' 
while leaving their intrinsic 'natures' unaccessible to us. Worrall's also employs the Ramsey sentence 
approach to structural realism. By dividing the content of a theory into observational and theoretical  
and by replacing every theoretical  term by existentially  bound variables,  the Ramsey sentence can 
eliminate direct reference to unobservable entities. It renders the first-order properties and relations of  
theoretical  entities  epistemically  unaccessible,  while  the  second order  properties  and  relations  are 
epistemically accessible.
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the synthetic a priori is for Kant (Poincaré 2001, 59).9 He also believes that arithmetic, 
a necessary presupposition for geometry, is synthetic a priori. As a consequence we 
can obtain knowledge of the relations only by employing a framework of constitutive 
principles that are imposed on the world by us. Thus, Poincaré's view could be better 
characterised as internal structural realism, a view which does not commit one to the 
metaphysical premise of scientific realism. 
  
3. Poincaré’s acceptance of the atom after Perrin’s experiments
Before  Jean Perrin’s experiments,  Poincaré regards the atomic hypothesis with the 
same hostility  as  Duhem, and also Ernst  Mach and Wilhelm Ostwald,  who argue 
against  it  on  methodological  and  scientific  grounds.  Poincaré  regards  the  atomic 
hypothesis as 'indifferent', meaning that it cannot be subjected to empirical test and 
can therefore be adopted at best as a fictional instrument but abandoned as soon as it 
fails to serve its purpose. According to Poincaré the atomic hypothesis belongs to the 
set of 'indifferent' hypotheses because even if the theory that adopts it is confirmed, 
we can in no way conclude that it is true. Before calculations are produced we can 
either adopt  atomism,  and  believe  that  matter  is  composed of  small  particles,  or 
contrary to atomism, suppose matter to be continuous. In each case, Poincaré argues, 
we are going to produce the same calculations. 
Atomism is  unappealing to Duhem, Mach and Ostwald because it  explains 
observable  phenomena  in  terms  of  unobservables.  Duhem,  for  example,  strongly 
disagrees  with  atomism on methodological  grounds.  He believes  that  the  method 
followed by the proponents of atomism is not scientific but metaphysical, and as a 
consequence, by adopting atomism we are delaying the progress of science. Since our 
experience does  not  give  us knowledge of the  unobservable,  searching for  causes 
beyond the observable makes science become “subordinate to metaphysics.” (Duhem 
1954, 10) Duhem states that “these two questions—Does there exist a material reality 
distinct from sensible appearances? And What is the nature of this reality?—do not 
have their  source in  experimental  method, which is  acquainted only with sensible 
appearances and can discover nothing beyond them. The resolution of these questions 
transcends the methods used by physics; it is the object of metaphysics.” (ibid)
Duhem and Poincaré’s methodological objection to atomism is also expressed 
by Ostwald. As Peter Achinstein (2007) suggests, Ostwald’s objections were scientific 
as well as philosophical. Ostwald disagrees with the reductionist approach of atomism 
because  it  reduced  non-mechanical  phenomena,  such  as  heat,  electricity  and 
magnetism,  to  the  motion  of  atoms  which  obey  only  mechanical  laws.  Most 
importantly, Ostwald disagrees with atomism on methodological grounds holding that 
the aim of science is not to discover 'essences' (i.e. the causes of the phenomena), but 
to  coordinate  measurable  quantities;  for  this  reason,  atomism violates  the  aim of 
science.  
While  Ostwald  and  Poincaré  changed  their  view  regarding  atomism  after 
Thomson’s  and  Perrin’s  experiments,  which  are  regarded  as  decisive  evidence  in 
favour of atomism, Duhem never accepted the atomic hypothesis. The reason for this 
comes from the fact that he was not only a physicist and a philosopher, but also a 
chemist, involved in the development of an alternative scientific theory. Duhem was a 
proponent of the (then) empirically equivalent theory of energetics, which according 
to  him,  can  account  for  the  same  phenomena  without  using  metaphysical  claims 
9 Poincaré's 'hierarchical' approach of different a priori, conventional and empirical sciences and their  
relationship and epistemic status is discussed in detail in Friedman (1999, 71-89).   
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regarding the nature of matter. Even after Perrin’s experiments are known to him, he 
argues that:
The  school  of  the  neo-atomism,  the  doctrines  of  which  center  on  the 
concept of the electron, have taken up again with supreme confidence the 
method we refuse to follow. This school thinks its hypotheses attain at last 
the inner structure of matter, that they make us see the elements as if some 
extraordinary ultra-microscope were to enlarge them until they were made 
perceivable to us. (Duhem 1913, 238)
Our own view, Energetics, does not proceed in this manner. The principles 
it embodies and from which it derives conclusions do not aspire at all to 
resolve  the  bodies  we  perceive  or  the  motions  we  report  into 
imperceivable  bodies  or  hidden  motions.  Energetics  claims  to  explain 
nothing. Energetics simply gives general rules of which the laws observed 
by the experimentalists are particular cases. (ibid., 233)
Unlike Duhem, Poincaré’s disagreement with atomism does not stem from his 
advocacy of the theory of energetics; he accepts that atomism could serve as a useful 
hypothesis but stresses that we should not take it at face value. His skepticism about 
atomism stems from the methodological worry that hypotheses about unobservable 
entities are tested holistically, a fact that does not entail the confirmation of the atomic 
hypothesis in light of agreement of the theory with experiment:10
If, then, experiment confirms his calculations, will he suppose that he has 
proved, for example, the real existence of atoms? […] These indifferent 
hypotheses  are  never  dangerous  provided  their  characters  are  not 
misunderstood. They might be useful either as artifices for calculation, or 
to assist our understanding by concrete images, to fix our ideas, as we say. 
(Poincaré 1902, 117)
Poincaré’s objection to atomism stems from the impossibility of independently testing 
a hypothesis that makes claims about the unobservable reality. He does accept that 
these hypotheses might prove useful for making predictions but nevertheless believes 
that, given the holistic nature of confirmation, we cannot establish their truth.11 
The object of mathematical theories is not to reveal to us the real nature of 
things;  that  would  be  unreasonable  claim.  Their  only  object  is  to 
coordinate the physical  laws with which physical experiments make us 
acquainted,  the enunciation of which,  without  the  aim of  mathematics, 
would be unable to effect. Whether the ether exists or not matters little—
let  us leave that to the metaphysicians;  what is essential  for us is, that 
everything happens as if it existed, and that hypothesis is found suitable 
10 One could of course argue that this goes against Poincaré's defence of a non-holistic approach to  
epistemology.  However  the fact  that  he defends the  role  of  constitutive  principles,  which  he  calls  
'conventions  in  disguise',  is  a  separate  issue  to  the  fact  that  he  advocates  a  holistic  approach  to 
confirmation, at least in his discussions of the atomic hypothesis. The atomic hypothesis is indifferent,  
not constitutive, so it does not have the same epistemological status.
11 Poincaré suggests that questions regarding the existence of unobservable entities, such as electrons or 
the ether, are “devoid of meaning.” (Poincaré 1902, 125)
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for the explanation of phenomena. […] some day, no doubt, the ether will 
be thrown aside as useless. (ibid, 156)
To  summarise,  the  reason  for  Poincaré’s  skepticism  towards  the  atomic 
hypothesis  is  due to  its  dependence on unobservable entities,  and impossibility of 
subjecting  it  to  empirical  test.  However,  Poincaré's  view  appears  to  change 
dramatically in his 1912 paper, where he accepts the existence of the atom. What 
Perrin had done in his experiments, which was quickly made known to Poincaré, was 
provide evidence for the existence of molecules and atoms based on thirteen distinct 
ways to calculate the precise value of Avogadro’s number (the number of molecules 
contained in a mole of gas). Familiar with these results, Poincaré famously argues 
that: 
The  former  hypotheses  of  mechanics  and  atomic  theory  have  of  late 
assumed scientific consistence to cease appearing to us as a hypothesis. 
The atoms are no longer a convenient fiction; it seems so to speak, that we 
can see them since we know how to count them. (Poincaré 1913, 89)
The  brilliant  determinations  of  the  number  of  atoms computed  by Mr 
Perrin  have  completed  the triumph of  atomism. What makes  it  all  the 
more  convincing  are  the  multiple  correspondences  between  results 
obtained by totally different processes.  […] We have arrived at  such a 
point that, if there had been any discordances, we would not have been 
puzzled as to how to explain them; but fortunately there have not been 
any. The atom of the chemist is now a reality. (ibid, 91)
Poincaré's paper indicates a radical shift in his views about atomism. Before these 
experiments were known to him, Poincaré treats the atomic hypothesis at best as a 
useful fiction, which does not deserve to be treated as a genuine scientific hypothesis,  
since  it  was  not  subject  to  empirical  testing.  But  this  objection,  which  is  purely 
methodological, could no longer hold after Perrin’s experiments.  
4. Challenging the traditional understanding of Poincaré’s acceptance of atomism
How are  we to  interpret  this  radical  change in  Poincaré’s  view about  the  atomic 
hypothesis?  One  way  of  viewing  the  shift  from  believing  atoms  are  fictions  to 
believing they are real is to argue that Poincaré abandons his anti-realism towards 
unobservable  entities  and  becomes  a  realist.  According  to  Gardner,  for  example, 
“there was a gradual transition from an instrumentalistic to realistic acceptance of the 
atomic theory, because of gradual increases in its predictive power, the “testedness” of 
its hypotheses, the “determinateness” of its quantities, and because of resolutions of 
doubts about the acceptability of its basic explanatory concepts.” (Gardner 1979, 1) 
For  all  the  above reasons,  Gardner  suggests,  many physicists,  including  Ostwald, 
accepted the existence of the atom. This acceptance seems to favour a scientific realist 
reading of the atomic hypothesis, since scientific realists commit to the unobservable 
entities postulated by empirically successful theories. Psillos suggests such a realist 
reading of Poincaré’s 1912 paper: 
The  point  Poincaré  made  should  be  well-noted.  Although  atoms  are 
invisible, we can (and have) amass(ed) much indirect evidence for their 
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existence. In particular, all the different ways to calculate the number of 
atoms in a certain volume, and that there is a fixed number of atoms, make 
it  highly  plausible  that  these  microscopic  entities  are  real.  Unless  we 
accept their reality, we can hardly explain the observable phenomena. Nor 
can  we explain  that  we can calculate  with such a  great  precision  how 
many atoms there are in a certain volume. In other words, it would be a 
great coincidence if atoms did not exist and yet all experimental findings 
were  exactly  those  predicted  by  atomic  theory.  The  very  fact  that  the 
atomic  hypothesis  finds  empirical  support  in  the  many  and  distinct 
domains in which atoms supposedly operate causally to generate certain 
observable phenomena gives good reason to accept that atoms are real. 
So, eliminative instrumentalism flies in the face of the fact that certain 
properties of atoms, including how many of those there are in a certain 
volume, can be fully determined by sound experimental practice. (Psillos 
1999, 22)
Psillos'  argument  implies  that  Poincaré  abandons  his  structural  realism,  for 
which he has constructed many sophisticated arguments and is integrated into his neo-
Kantian philosophy, and becomes a scientific realist, a view which he clearly opposes 
in  his  previous  work.12 The  implication  of  this  reading  is  that  after  Perrin’s 
experiments, Poincaré no longer has a structuralist stance towards theories but holds 
that the atomic hypothesis is true and that atoms, as described by it, exist and we have 
knowledge of their nature. In fact, Poincaré's argument might be seen as motivating 
'entity realism', since it is based on the experimental detection of atoms. As developed 
by  Ian  Hacking  and  Nancy  Cartwright,  entity  realism  states  that  we  know  the 
existence of an entity if we have established causal contact with it independently of 
the theoretical descriptions associated with this entity that can change from one theory 
to  another.  As  Hacking  argues,  the  strongest  justification  for  realism  about 
unobservable entities is the fact that we can manipulate them. He claims, for the case 
of positrons and electrons, that “[s]o far as I'm concerned, if you can spray them, then 
they are real.” (Hacking 1983, 23) However, it has been persuasively argued that this 
form of realism collapses into scientific realism (Psillos 1999, Massimi 2003). Since 
detection of an entity requires knowledge of its properties and causal powers, appeal 
to the theory that best  describes these entities is necessary. As a consequence, the 
entity  realist  cannot  establish  that  causal  contact  with  an  unobservable  entity  is 
possible without realism about the theory that describes what is been detected. This 
shows that we can either adopt a strong scientific realist interpretation of  Poincaré's 
acceptance of the atom, or preserve his structuralism by showing that it is compatible 
with this acceptance. 
To  support  the  latter  interpretation,  I  want  to  note  an  objection  to  reading 
Poincaré's argument as favouring scientific realism stemming from the metaphysical 
claim of scientific  realism – belief  in a mind-independent  reality,  which scientific 
theories reveal. Given Poincaré's Kantianism and belief that we have access only to 
phenomena and not to things in themselves, it is implausible to hold that he believes 
that the atom is a mind-independent entity that the atomic hypothesis reveals to us. On  
12 Stump (1989) also argues that Poincaré's argument establishes realism towards the atom and thus 
shows that he should not be regarded as instrumentalist. However, Stump also notes that Poincaré is not 
a scientific realist but has no reason to deny the existence of unobservable entities all together. Stump 
argues that Poincaré's position is similar to Shapere's (1969), who believes that the problem of whether  
theoretical terms refer to a particular unobservable entity should be resolved in a case-by-case manner 
(Stump 1989, 339). 
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the contrary,  it  is  plausible  to  suggest that the atom of the chemist and physicist, 
which Poincaré accepts as real, simply becomes part of the phenomenal world. The 
atom of the chemist cannot be seen as the 'thing in itself', that causes the observed 
phenomena and on which all other entities supervene. The atom of the chemist simply 
becomes part of the phenomenal world.13 
If  the  atom is  not  part  of  the  mind-independent  world  then  it  seems that  a 
scientific realist interpretation of Poincaré's argument is not tenable. Nevertheless, his 
1912 paper does indicate a change in his attitude towards the atomic hypothesis. But 
how is this acceptance to be understood? Krips argues against the idea that Poincaré’s 
acceptance of the atom, after Perrin’s experiments, indicates a change of view towards 
the atomic hypothesis, that is, from instrumentalism to scientific realism. He claims 
that: 
there was a widespread late-nineteenth century methodological tradition 
which motivated the change in status of certain ontological claims - e.g., 
that  atoms  exist  –  from  ‘inaccessible  to  science’  to  ‘scientifically 
acceptable’ even though those claims were not strictly ‘observable’. This 
methodological tradition is a hybrid of positivist and realist views. Thus, 
contrary to one popular view, the fin de siècle triumph of atomism is not 
to be seen as a triumph for a realist view of science. (Krips 1986, 43)
On this reading, Poincaré does not become a realist about the atomic hypothesis but 
the  atomic  hypothesis  simply  changes  its  status.  Note  the  distinction  Poincaré 
introduces in Science and Hypothesis between empirical, conventional and indifferent 
hypotheses.14 Before  Perrin’s  experiments,  the  atomic  hypothesis  was  simply  an 
indifferent  hypothesis,  making  metaphysical  claims  about  the  nature  of  the 
unobservable  reality.  These  claims,  according  to  Poincaré,  are  not  essential  for 
deriving  experimental  results.  Whether  matter  is  infinitely  divisible  or  has  a 
fundamental, indivisible nature does not affect our predictions because the question 
does not have empirical significance. After Perrin’s experiments,  this changes: the 
atomic hypothesis has empirical nature; it makes predictions that can be subjected to 
experimental test. Therefore, Krips argues, the switch was not in Poincaré’s views 
about scientific theories, but in his classification of the atomic hypothesis; from an 
indifferent hypothesis it becomes an empirical one.   
13 Poincaré makes an interesting claim about atoms being 'observable': “it seems so to speak, that we 
can see them since we know how to count them.” (Poincaré 1913, 89) His criterion of acceptance of an 
unobservable  entity  extends from direct  accessibility  to  our  senses  to  detectable  by  measurement.  
However, one could see the notion of observability endorsed by Poincaré as having a broader meaning, 
along the lines of Dudley Shapere's (1982) notion of observability that goes beyond direct observation 
to what is experimentally detectable by instruments. An example of indirect observation, discussed by 
Shapere, includes detecting neutrinos that travel without interaction from the nucleus of the sun, and 
which interact with the detection device, serving as means of indirectly 'observing' the nucleus of the  
sun. However, such a liberal understanding of the term 'observable' would leave the distinction between  
scientific and structural realism unclear. Thus, the term 'observable' here should best be understood as 
'detectable'.  Also,  note  that  'detectable'  or  'observable'  does  not  equate  with  being  part  of  the 
phenomenal world. The distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal world does not reduce to 
the observable-unobservable  distinction. 
14 Poincaré's regards metaphysical hypotheses, such as hypotheses regarding the composition of matter, 
indifferent because they do not change the empirical predictions. Conventional hypotheses are not like 
the  metaphysical  hypotheses  because  they  play  a  central  function  for  the  derivation  of  empirical 
content – they are constitutive in the sense that they are necessary presuppositions for the empirical  
content of a theory. 
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Krips'  reading brings into light an important  distinction which needs to be 
made. Which atom is Poincaré accepting? The atom of the physicist is a (divisible) 
particle  that  composes  matter  and  obeys  mechanical  laws.  Poincaré  discusses  the 
difficulties for the current  physicists to employ the atomic hypothesis and explain 
known  phenomena.  The  atom  of  the  chemist,  which  Poincaré  accepts,  comes  in 
different  species which in  different  combinations gives rise  to  different  kinds  and 
chemical  properties.  The  atom  of  the  metaphysician,  on  the  other  hand,  is  an 
indivisible, fundamental particle, on which all other particles supervene. In light of 
this distinction, we should treat Poincaré's acceptance with care. He is not committed 
to  the fundamental  entity  of  the  metaphysician but  to  the existence  of  some new 
phenomena that have been 'counted'. This acceptance makes perfect sense within a 
Kantian reading of Poincaré and does not entail abandonment of his structuralism. It 
can be seen as suggesting that since the atomic theory has become empirical, we can 
have a structural realist attitude towards it.  
Drawing the distinction between the different meanings of atomism allows us 
to understand better what Poincaré aims to establish. Even though I have argued that a 
scientific  realist  reading  of  Poincaré’s  views  is  not  plausible,  it  is  important 
nonetheless to understand how his acceptance of the atom could be seen to challenge 
a structural realist reading of his philosophy. It is currently accepted that Poincaré’s 
attitude  towards  scientific  theories  is  structural  realist.  If  Poincaré  argues  for  the 
existence  of  an  unobservable  entity,  then  this  reading  is  challenged. One  cannot 
coherently be a structural realist and accept the existence of an unobservable entity 
and the properties assigned to it by the best available scientific theory. According to 
structural realism, we can know the relations between unobservable entities, but not 
their  properties (their nature).  We can differentiate three mutually exclusive views 
regarding unobservable entities,  which structural  realists  can endorse.  A structural 
realist can be (1) agnostic as to whether there are unobservable entities. Or, (2) she 
can hold that there are unobservable entities, but our epistemic restriction does not 
allow us to know their 'nature' (that is, their first order properties). Or (3) a structural 
realist  can  employ  the  argument  for  coherence  between  epistemology  and 
metaphysics and suggest that since all we can know is relations and not the entities 
themselves, then we should eliminate the unobservable entities from our ontology. 
This version is compatible with Ladyman's (1998) ontic structural realism. 
It is an open question as to whether Poincaré believes there are unobservable 
entities  or  he  is  agnostic.  Whichever  version  of  structural  realism  we  believe  is 
adopted by Poincaré, his acceptance of the atom clashes with it. If we take Poincaré’s 
view to  admit  that  there  are  unobservable  entities  of  which  we cannot  know the 
properties,  a  view  which  is  compatible  at  least  with  his  (1902),  this  view  is 
incompatible with his acceptance of the atom. The epistemic restriction from knowing 
the nature of the atom should forbid a structural realist from admitting its existence. 
We simply cannot hold both that, on the one hand, we cannot know anything about 
unobservable entities apart from the structure they give rise to, and, on the other hand, 
suggest  that  we have  established epistemic  access  to  an  unobservable  entity.  The 
agnostic form of structural realism is also incompatible with Poincaré’s acceptance of 
the  atom,  since  it  advocates  agnosticism  towards  whether  there  are  particular 
unobservable entities. Therefore, whichever form of structural realism is associated 
with Poincaré’s philosophy of  science in  general,  it  cannot be consistent  with his 
acceptance of an unobservable entity with some particular set of properties. 
I have so far argued that Poincaré's acceptance of the atom does not indicate a 
shift from structural to scientific realism. However, I want to look more carefully at 
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the argument Poincaré develops and show, in light of the three different meanings of 
atomism mentioned above, that the argument is not only aimed at showing the shift in 
status  of  the  atomic  hypothesis,  but  is  also  aimed  against  fundamentalism.  This 
argument, I argue, is perfectly compatible with Poincaré's structuralism and fits his 
general philosophy of science. 
5. A closer look at Poincaré’s argument  
Let us examine carefully what exactly Poincaré states in his 1912 paper. According to 
him: 
The brilliant  determinations  of  the  number  of  atoms computed  by Mr. 
Perrin  have  completed  the triumph of  atomism. What makes  it  all  the 
more  convincing  are  the  multiple  correspondences  between  results 
obtained by totally different processes. Not too long ago, we would have 
considered ourselves fortunate if the numbers thus derived had contained 
the same number of digits. We would not even have required that the first 
significant  figure be the same; this first  figure is now determined; and 
what is remarkable is that the most diverse properties of the atom have 
been considered. In the processes derived from the Brownian movement 
or in those in which the law of radiation is invoked, not the atoms have 
been counted directly, but the degrees of freedom. In the one in which we 
use the blue of the sky, the mechanical properties of the atoms no longer 
come into play;  they are  considered as  causes of  optical  discontinuity. 
Finally,  when radium is used, it  is the emissions of projectiles that are 
counted.  We have  arrived  at  such  a  point  that,  if  there  had  been any 
discordances, we would not have been puzzled as to how to explain them; 
but fortunately there have not been any. The atom of the chemist is now a 
reality. (Poincaré 1913, 90-91)
This, so far, seems to be a positive argument for the acceptance of the atom. It is this 
quotation  that  has  given  rise  to  the  different  interpretations  and  debates  about 
Poincaré’s realism towards the atomic hypothesis. However, the ‘reality’ of the atom 
is not the conclusion of Poincaré’s argument, it is simply a premise of an argument 
which does not intend to motivate in a positive manner realism towards the atom. Let 
us see how this argument continues: 
The atom of the chemist is now a reality; but this does not mean that we 
are about to arrive at the ultimate elements of matter. When Democritus 
invented the atoms, he considered them as absolutely indivisible elements 
beyond which there is nothing to seek. That is what that means in Greek; 
and it is for this reason, after all, that he had invented them. Behind the 
atom,  he  wanted  no  more  mystery.  The  atom  of  the  chemist  would 
therefore  not  have  given him any  satisfaction;  for  this  atom is  by  no 
means indivisible; it is not truly an element; it is not free of mystery; this  
atom is a world. (ibid. 91, my emphasis)
Poincaré argues that even if we take Perrin’s experiment to tell us that the atomic 
hypothesis is now a successful empirical theory, we should not conclude that we have 
reached the fundamental level of reality, as was initially intended by the construction 
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of atomism. To reconstruct the argument: the first premise of the argument is that the 
empirical determination of the atomic number by Perrin indicates that the atom is real. 
The second premise states that what we understand by ‘atom’ is an indivisible element 
of  matter.  The  third  premise  is  that  the  atom  discovered  by  Perrin  is  divisible. 
Therefore, the atom discovered by Perrin is not really an 'atom', that is, the entity that 
Perrin has managed to empirically count, is not an indivisible element of reality.
Poincaré  continues  his  argument  by  suggesting  that  the  atom  itself  is 
composed of other entities; it is a complicated “solar system”. According to him:
Each new discovery in physics reveals a new complexity of the atom. And 
first of all the bodies which were believed to be simple, and which, in 
many respects  behave exactly  like simple bodies,  are  capable of being 
broken down into simpler ones still. […] This is not all. In the atoms we 
find other things: in it, first of all, we find electrons. Each atom therefore 
seems  to  be  a  sort  of  solar  system in  which  some  negative  electrons 
playing the role of planets gravitate around a large positive electron which 
plays the role of central sun. […] But we have not come to the end. After 
electrons  or  atoms  of  electricity  come  the  magnetons  or  atoms  of 
magnetism. […]  What then is a magneton? Is it something simple? No, if 
we do not wish to abandon Ampere’s hypothesis of currents of particles. A 
magneton is therefore a vortex of electrons and our atom now becomes 
more and more complicated. (Poincaré 1913, 91-93) 
This argument makes it clear that the question with which Poincaré is concerned is 
not whether we should be realists about unobservable entities such as the atom. Since 
the atomic hypothesis is empirically testable, leads to more predictions and is more 
fruitful,  there is  no question that we should accept it  as an empirically successful 
theory.  The question is  whether we should think that  we have found the ultimate 
element of reality. 
Poincaré claims that our starting point was believing that matter is composed 
of  atoms  –  understood  as  indivisible  building  blocks  of  matter.  However,  further 
discoveries  reveal  that  atoms are themselves  complex systems composed of  other 
particles – electrons. Science, then, gives us no grounds to suspect that we will find a 
fundamental particle. What this argument shows is that we have inductive grounds to 
expect that we cannot find a fundamental level of nature. It is this argument which 
deserves  attention  and  has  passed  unnoticed  in  the  literature.  It  suggests  that  we 
cannot legitimately infer from the history of science that we will find a fundamental 
level of reality. 
6. Fundamentalism and Structural Realism  
I  have  argued  that  Poincaré’s  argument  for  the  acceptance  of  the  atom does  not 
indicate a shift from structural to scientific realism but simply a shift in how Poincaré 
classifies the atomic hypothesis. This acceptance, however, needs to be understood 
with  care  as  it  indicates  the  complexity  of  the  atomic  hypothesis,  which  can  be 
thought of as a conjunction of metaphysical, physical and chemical hypotheses. In this 
section I explain why Poincaré does not accept the metaphysical hypothesis of his 
atomist scientific realist  opponents, even when he 'accepts the atom', and why his 
argument is perfectly compatible with his structuralism. 
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An  argument  against  fundamentalism,  relevant  to  Poincaré's,  has  been 
developed in the current literature by Jonathan Schaffer. According to Schaffer:
The  fundamentalist  starts  with  (a)  a  hierarchical  picture  of  nature  as 
stratified into levels, adds (b) an assumption that there is a bottom level 
which is fundamental, and winds up, often enough, with (c) an ontological 
attitude  according  to  which  the  entities  of  the  fundamental  level  are 
primarily  real,  while  any  remaining  contingent  entities  are  at  best 
derivative,  if real  at all.  Thus […] the atomist claims that there are no 
macroentities at all but only fundamental entities in various arrangements. 
(Schaffer 2003, 498)
Schaffer  questions  the  assumption  that  there  is  a  fundamental  level  to  nature  for 
several  reasons,  amongst  which is  the alleged fact  that such an assumption is  not 
supported by modern physics. He suggests that the view that there is a bottom level, 
on which all the rest supervene, is highly problematic. He explains the commitment of 
the fundamentalist view as follows: 
The peripheral connotation of ‘levels’ include those of (a) a supervenience  
structure, ordered by asymmetric dependencies; (b) a realization structure, 
ordered by functional relations; and (c) a  nomological structure, ordered 
by  one-way  bridge  principle  between  families  of  lawfully  interrelated 
properties. (ibid, 500) 
Schaffer argues that we should question mereological fundamentalism on inductive 
and naturalistic grounds15:
The history of science is a history of seeking ever-deeper structure. We 
have gone from ‘the elements’ to ‘the atoms’ to the subatomic electrons, 
protons and neutrons, to the zoo of ‘elementary particles’, to thinking that 
the hadrons are built out of quarks […] Should one not expect the future 
to be like the past? (ibid., 503)
Following Schaffer, Ladyman and Ross (2007) also question the intuition that the
world comes in ‘levels’. Contemporary science [...] gives no interesting 
content to this metaphor, and so a metaphysics built according to the PNC 
15 Kerry McKenzie (2011) opposes the plausibility of the inductivist argument.  She doubts there is 
sufficient  number  of  examples  from  the  history  of  science  to  support  the  meta-induction.  Most 
importantly,  she  agues  that  despite  appearances,  the  inductivist  argument  is  not  naturalistically 
motivated because it  presupposes that  the same dependence relation is  to be exemplified in future 
physics.  She  argues  that  “the  insuperable  problem  with  historic-inductive  arguments  against 
fundamentality such as Schaffer's is that they necessarily rest upon speculative assumptions regarding 
the metaphysics of future physics that  are surely at  odds with the naturalistic agenda.” (McKenzie 
2011, 248) She claims that questions regarding fundamentality can only be resolved internally, that is, 
within a particular physical theory and demonstrates how the claim of mereological fundamentality can 
be questioned within the S-matrix theory of strong interactions.  
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[Principle of Naturalistic Closure16] should not reflect it.” (Ladyman and 
Ross 2007, 54) 
They explicitly side with Schaffer's inductive argument and claim that 
[a]rguably  we  do  have  inductive  grounds  for  denying  that  there  is  a 
fundamental level since every time one has been posited, it has turned out 
not to be fundamental after all (ibid., 187)
Schaffer’s  argument  against  fundamentalism  is  illuminating  for  our 
understanding  of  Poincaré.  Poincaré  can  be  interpreted  as  defending  Shaffer's 
argument against mereological atomism which is based on the observation that it is 
not supported by our current fundamental theories. Poincaré denies the presupposition 
of atomism that there is a bottom level to reality and suggests that even if atomism as 
a theory is false (that is, the atom is not an indivisible entity), such a theory still relies 
on the  idea that  there is  a  bottom level,  even if  that  level  is  not  the  atom. Most 
importantly,  Poincaré's  argument  is  epistemic  and not  metaphysical.  Poincaré  and 
Schaffer  remain agnostic  as to whether there really is  a fundamental level,  whilst 
arguing that we have reasons not to believe that we will find such a level. As Schaffer 
argues: 
[W]ith regard to whether the complete microphysics (if such there be) will 
postulate particles, I once again council agnosticism. Of course, if one is 
assuming atomism again, I can see why one would expect particles in the 
final theory. But here the dogma is chasing its tail again. (Schaffer 2003, 
505) 
[T]here are at  least  two perfectly good conceptions of the hierarchy of 
nature:  fundamentality  and  infinite  descent.  The  empirical  evidence  to 
date  is  neutral  as  to  which  structure  science  is  reflecting.  And  so, 
concerning the proposition that there exists a fundamental level of nature, 
one should withhold belief. (ibid, 506)
Schaffer’s argument, which I have shown to resemble Poincaré’s 1912 argument, is 
clearly  epistemic.  It  is  compatible  with  there  being  fundamental  entities,  whilst 
concluding that it is very unlikely that we will discover them. This argument differs 
from the metaphysical argument defended by  Ladyman and Ross, which holds that 
non-fundamentalism motivates  ontic  structural  realism,  claiming  that  “there  is  no 
fundamental level” on which all other levels supervene (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 
178). 
The metaphysical argument against fundamentalism, which denies that reality 
comes in levels and that there is a fundamental level on which the rest supervene, is  
compatible with Ladyman’s ontic structural realism but also with agnostic epistemic 
structural  realism,  since  the  latter  does  not  exclude  that  there  might  not  be 
unobservable entities  after  all.  If  Poincaré’s argument against fundamentalism was 
16 Ladyman and Ross define the Principle of Naturalistic Closure as follows “Any new metaphysical 
claim that is to be taken seriously at time t should be motivated by, and only by, the service it performs, 
if true, in showing how two or more specific scientific hypotheses, at least one of which is drawn from 
fundamental physics, jointly explain more than the sum of what is explained by the two hypotheses 
taken separately.” (2007, 37)
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metaphysical,  it  would be incompatible  with  the  first  kind of  epistemic  structural 
realism, according to which there are unobservable entities, the nature of which we 
cannot know. But the argument does not claim that our metaphysics must be coherent 
with our epistemology. It allows for reality to be, after all, composed of levels and for 
there to be a fundamental level on which all other levels supervene. Poincaré claims 
that given the failure of our past physical theories to find the fundamental level, we 
have grounds to infer that such a level might not be found, if it indeed exists, and thus 
motivates agnosticism with respect to whether there is such a level.  The epistemic 
argument  against  fundamentalism,  developed  by  Poincaré, is  perfectly  compatible 
with both forms of epistemic structural realism – the agnostic form, advocated by 
Worrall,  and  the  one  accepting  the  existence  of  unobservable  entities.  That  is, 
agnosticism towards whether there is a fundamental level to reality on which all other 
levels  supervene, is  compatible  with  agnosticism  regarding  whether  there  are 
unobservable entities or believing there are unobservable entities but we cannot know 
their intrinsic properties.  
It  should  be  noted  that  both  forms  of  epistemic  structural  realism  are 
compatible with both fundamentalism and non-fundamentalism. Since both forms of 
epistemic structural  realism leave open the possibility of there being unobservable 
entities, they are compatible with there being a fundamental level to reality, that is, 
fundamental entities on which all other entities supervene.17 
7. Conclusion
I  this  paper  I  have  argued  that  Poincaré’s  1912  paper,  in  which  he  accepts  the 
existence of the atom, does not indicate a shift from structural to scientific realism. I 
have presented his argument and explored why it could be seen as incompatible with 
Poincaré's structuralism and motivating scientific realism. After presenting the three 
different atomic hypotheses (metaphysical, physical and chemical), I side with Krips' 
reading  of  Poincaré's  acceptance,  which  holds  that  Poincaré  did  not  become  a 
scientific  realist,  but  the  atomic  hypothesis  simply  changed  its  status  from  a 
metaphysical to a scientific (empirical) theory. I have examined in detail Poincaré's 
argument and showed that it is not concerned with establishing the existence of an 
unobservable entity but with arguing against our ability to discover the fundamental 
level to reality. After explaining the anti-fundamentalism argument, I have shown that 
it is an epistemological argument that is compatible with Poincaré's structuralism.  
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